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NOTE S
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AS AF-
FECTED BY AN "UNREASONABLE SEARCH."
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures"
was recently upheld in the case of Flagg vs. United States.' In this
case the defendant was convicted in the lower court of devising a
scheme to defraud, and of using the mails in furtherance thereof,
but this conviction was not allowed to stand in the higher court
because it was arrived at by methods prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States, which is the fundamental law of the land.
The Constitution expressly provides against just such methods as
'Flagg vs. United States, 233 Fed. 481.
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were used in the instant case. In this case the defendant was ar-
rested at his place of business and his books, papers and other
property, taken into custody by the officers making the arrest, which
officers were acting not under any process or authority, but entirely
without warrant either of arrest or search. A warrant was later
issued for the arrest of his person, but not for the seizure of his
books, while these books were kept by the officials for over a year,
and it was upon proof procured from these books and papers during
the time that they were thus unlawfully kept, that the defendant
was finally convicted. As stated by the court (1. c. p. 483) "the
question then is reduced to this-can a party be convicted of a crime
upon proof procured from books and papers which have been taken
from him by force and without a pretense of legal authority? ",
and the court very justly and with sound reasoning answers this
question in the negative.
To answer this question in any other way would be to force
a "battering ram" through the bulwarks of personal security, for
the language of the United States Constitution is very clear upon
this point. It is guaranteed therein2 that "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized," and, later on,3 that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." If a person's books and papers could be seized in this
manner without the slightest vestige of legal authority, and informa-
tion gleaned therefrom by which such person is convicted of a
crime, is this not in effect compelling him to testify against himself
in a criminal case? It appears to the writer to be just as much
a compulsion, as the compulsory production of private papers under
an act, which act provides that if such papers are not produced for
the purpose of evidence, the prosecutors version shall be taken
as admitted. The rights guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution were preserved and shielded
from violation by such an act in the case of Boyd vs. United States.
4
In the case of Weeks vs. United States,5 which is the controlling
2Constitution of the United States, Art. IV.
sConstitution of United States, Art. V.
4Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S. 616.
5Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S. 383.
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decision in this case, and in which the facts are very similar to the
facts in the instant case, differing only in this; that the papers taken
were attempted to be used themselves instead of secondary evi-
dence gleaned therefrom, (which difference is immaterial insofar
as the principle here involved is concerned), the court reached the
same conclusion as is here reached, namely, that a party can not
be convicted by evidence obtained by a search and seizure, not in
the method prescribed by the fourth and fifth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, but directly contrary thereto and
in violation thereof.
Nor was the defendant compelled to submit to this conviction
and rely upon, as his only redress, whatever remedies he might
have against the officials making the arrest and seizure. The
language of the court in the Weeks case is as follows:
"What remedies the defendant may have against them
(the officials) we need not inquire, as the fourth amendment
is not directed to individual misconduct of such officials."
Veeder, District Judge, in the instant case concurred in the
result, as he felt that he was bound by the Weeks case, supra, but
took the position that if he were exercising his own judgment he
would sustain the conviction and leave the defendant to his remedies
for the violation of his security. He found it hard to reconcile the
Weeks Case with the case of Adams vs. New York, 6 both decided
by the same judge, for the Adams case held that the fourth Amend-
ment was designed to "give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted" but not to "exclude testimony which has been ob-
tained by such means, if it is otherwise competent." It is immaterial
whether the two cases can or can not be reconciled, for the Weeks
case is the "latest expression of the Supreme Court" and is accord-
ingly the view which must be adopted by the court in the decision
of the instant case.
At first sight this decision seems to lay down a dangerous
principle, as it seems to tip the scales of Justice in favor of an ac-
cused where the weight which thus overbalances the scales is not
the accused's innocence, but the unlawful actof a third party. Yet
upon closer scrutiny it will be seen that to lay down a contrary
principle would be to sacrifice one of the broad principles of our
fundamental law-a principle which is essential to Constitutional
liberty-the right to personal security. The preservation of this
principle will be found in the end to do justice to the greatest num-
Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S. 585.
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ber, which should be the aim of all principles of law. To sustain
this conviction would be to sanction the encroachment of unlawful
and arbitrary power upon individual rights, and render the Consti-
tution of the United States of no effect.
The decision in the instant case is, therefore, not only sup-
ported by the weight of authority but also by the weight of reasoning
and logic, and will end in doing justice to the greatest number, by
upholding the broad principles of the fundamental law of this
country.
SCOTT SEDDON.
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